

Message Text

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ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 R

66011

DRAFTED BY:S/S:FVORTIZ

APPROVED BY: S/S:ORTIZ

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R 051756Z JAN 76 ZFF4

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN

AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE

AMEMBASSY KINSHASA

AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE

S E C R E T STATE 001582

NODIS

FOLLOWING REPEAT DAKAR 0026 ACTION SECSTATE 03 JAN 76

QUOTE

S E C R E T DAKAR 0026

NODIS

FOR SECRETARY

FROM ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHAUFEELE

DEPARTMENT PLEASE REPEAT TO: ABIDJAN, LIBREVILLE, KINSHASA,
YAOUNDE

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, AO, SG, US

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH PRESIDENT SENGHOR ON ANGOLA

1. AT BEGINNING OF ONE HOUR CALL ON PRESIDENT SENGHOR

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHAUFEELE WENT THROUGH HIS TALKING POINTS.

KNOWING SENGHOR'S PREVIOUS VIEWS ON THE SUBJECT HE EMPHASIZED US DETERMINATION TO REMAIN INVOLVED TO MAINTAIN SITUATION ON THE GROUND WHICH COULD ENCOURAGE NEGOTIATION PROCESS. HE ALSO URGED SENGHOR TO TAKE LEAD IN ASSURING THAT MODERATE STATES PERSEVERE EVEN IN FACE VILIFICATION THEY OFTEN RECEIVE FROM SOME MEMBERS OF PRO-MPLA GROUP.

2. PRESIDENT SENGHOR SAW SENEGALESE AND US POSITIONS ON ANGOLA AS ESSENTIALLY THE SAME. HE WAS REASSURED BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHAUFLE'S PRESENTATION AND REITERATED HIS VIEW THAT ANGOLA CONSTITUTED MOST SERIOUS CRISIS EXPERIENCED BY MODERN AFRICA. NEVER BEFORE, SENGHOR SAID, HAS USSR SHOWN ITS TRUE FACE IN SAME DIMENSION. HE FELT IF US FAILED TO RESIST SOVIET THRUST, ALL AFRICA WOULD BE TERRORIZED. SENGHOR SAID SOVIET AMBASSADOR, WHEN SUMMONED TO DISCUSS NEED FOR WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN TROOPS FROM ANGOLA, ACKNOWLEDGED THAT US AND USSR WERE DISCUSSING ANGOLAN PROBLEM. SENGHOR SAID US/USSR DIALOGUE SHOULD CONTINUE IN QUEST OF SOLUTION TO ANGOLAN SITUATION.

3. SENGHOR NOTED THAT DURING HIS RECENT CENTRAL AFRICAN TOUR, ONLY NGOUABI OF FIVE CHIEFS OF STATE HE MET WAS MORE CONCERNED BY SOUTH AFRICAN THAN BY SOVIET INVOLVEMENT. SENGHOR CALLED SOVIET UNION IMPERIALISTIC AND RACIST, AND CONFIRMED HE HAD PUT OFF SINE DIE HIS TRIP TO USSR AFTER BOTH FRENCH AND GOS INTELLIGENCE COUNSELLED HIM NOT TO MAKE VISIT IN WAKE OF PRAVDA ARTICLES ATTACKING HIS POLICIES. SENEGAL WAS ON VERGE OF EXPELLING SOVIET DIPLOMAT WHO HAD DIRECTLY SOUGHT INFO FROM GOS MILITARY. IN DISCUSSING "SOVIET MENACE," SENGHOR SAID SEVERAL AFRICAN COUNTRIES INCLUDING EGYPT, ZAIRE AND ETHIOPIA HAD LEARNED OR WERE LEARNING BITTER LESSONS ON DEALING WITH SOVIET AID. BUT, HE SAID, NEW AFRICAN IMPERIALISTS--ALGERIA AND NIGERIA--WERE TRYING TO FORM UNHOLY ALLIANCE OF BIG AFRICAN STATES AND WERE WITTING OR UNWITTING INSTRUMENTS OF SOVIET POLICY. SENGHOR REITERATED HIS OBJECTIONS TO NIGERIAN POSITION ON ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES, POINTING OUT DYNAMISM WHICH COMMUNITY STRETCHING FROM MAURITANIA TO ZAIRE WOULD HAVE. SENGHOR SAID HE FAVORED DETENTE BETWEEN USSR AND US BUT THAT IF SOLUTION NOT FOUND TO SOVIET THRUST IN ANGOLA, MODERATE STATES WOULD BE TAKEN OVER ONE BY ONE AND SOVIETS WOULD BE STRONGLY INSTALLED ON CONTINENT.

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4. SENGHOR AGREED IN GENERAL WITH POSSIBLE PROGRAM FOR SOLUTION TO ANGOLAN CRISIS OUTLINED BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHAUFLE. HE FELT THAT WITH CEASEFIRE SHOULD ALSO COME CESSATION OF SHIPMENT OF ARMS, TECHNICIANS AND SOLDIERS. SENGHOR SAID THAT AFRICAN AND NON-AFRICAN STATES INVOLVED IN ANGOLA SHOULD WITHDRAW. THERE SHOULD BE NEGOTIATIONS TOWARD GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNION, WHICH COULD LEAD EVENTUALLY TO ELECTIONS WITH PLURALITY OF PARTIES. SENGHOR SAID HE WOULD CONTINUE TO WORK AGAINST UNILATERAL RECOGNITION

OF MPLA IN TALKS WITH FELLOW AFRICAN PRESIDENTS. AT CILSS MEETING IN NOUAKCHOTT, HE FOUND IT WAS AGREED--EVEN BY TWO STATES WHICH HAD RECOGNIZED MPLA (CAPE VERDE AND MALI)--THAT ALL INTERNATIONAL FORCES SHOULD BE REMOVED AND AFRICAN SOLUTION FOUND.

5. SENEGAL WOULD SEND STRONG DELEGATION TO ADDIS AND WOULD WORK IN SUPPORT OF NEGOTIATED SOLUTION. IT WOULD NOT BE OVERWHELMED BY THREATS BY MPLA-SUPPORTERS. SENGHOR POINTED OUT THAT OAU HAD ALREADY TAKEN POSITION IN FAVOR OF GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY. HE FELT THOSE WHO SUPPORTED MPLA RISKED DESTROYING OAU. SENGHOR SAID HE HAD ORDERED HIS FONMIN TO PROPOSE DIALOGUE (WHICH HE SAID WAS "AFRICAN WAY" TO TRUTH) IN ORDER TO AVOID DIVISION OF AFRICA INTO TWO PARTS.

6. ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHAUFEELE SAID HE HOPED SENGHOR AND OTHER CHIEFS OF STATE WOULD CONTINUE EFFORTS FOR AFRICAN SOLUTION TO ANGOLAN PROBLEM. HE EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT PRESIDENTS HOUPHOUET-BOIGNY, BONGO AND AHIDJO HAD NOT CONFIRMED INTENTION TO ATTEND OAU SUMMIT. SENGHOR SAID HE WOULD CALL PRIME MINISTER IMMEDIATELY AND ARRANGE TO SEND GOS EMISSARIES TO TRY TO PERSUADE THREE LEADERS TO GO. SCHAUFEELE CONVEYED HOUPHOUET'S CONCERN ABOUT SEEMING TILT OF PRESIDENT JAWARA OF GAMBIA TOWARD MPLA. SENGHOR SAID JAWARA HAD GONE TO GUINEA ON MISSION WITH WHICH HE WAS QUITE FAMILIAR (HAVING TO DO WITH UTILIZATION OF GAMBIA RIVER RESOURCES), AND HE WAS NOT CONCERNED ABOUT JAWARA OR ABOUT PRESIDENT OULD DADDAH OF MAURITANIA SINCE HE WOULD TAKE THEM TO ADDIS ON HIS AIRCRAFT AND WOULD BE ABLE TO WORK ON THEM DURING TRIP.

7. SENGHOR SAID THAT SENEGAL AND OTHER MODERATE STATES WOULD NOT ACCEPT SOLUTION OF OAU DECISION BASED ON MPLA RECOGNITION BY A MAJORITY OF AFRICAN STATES. IF DIALOGUE DID NOT PRODUCE NEGOTIATED SOLUTION, SENEGAL WOULD SUPPORT RECOGNITION OF FNLA/UNITA REGIME.

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8. COMMENT: ALTHOUGH BEFORE ARRIVAL I HAD IMPRESSION THAT SENGHOR WAS SLACKING OFF ON ANGOLA, HE CAME THROUGH STRONG AND RESOLUTE. THERE WAS NO DOUBT OF HIS GOING TO SUMMIT AND HE JUMPED IN IMMEDIATELY WHEN I DESCRIBED HESITATIONS OF BONGO, AHIDJO AND HOUPHOUET-BOIGNY AND SAID HE WOULD URGE THEM ATTEND ALSO. EVEN FONMIN SECK WHOM WE SAW LATER AND WHO TENDS TO BE LESS FORCEFUL THAN SENGHOR, GAVE EVERY EVIDENCE OF ALREADY HAVING HIS INSTRUCTIONS FOR OAU FONMIN MEETING IN THE SAME VEIN AS SENGHOR SPOKE TO ME.

9. AT THIS POINT, AMONG CHIEFS OF STATE I HAVE SEEN, SENGHOR SEEMS LIKE THE BEST BET FOR LEADERSHIP. HE CLEARLY STATED HIS INTENTION TO STAND FIRM AND, IF NECESSARY, RECOGNIZE FNLA/UNITA. AGGREY

UNQUOTE KISSINGER

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, CAT-B, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 05 JAN 1976
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: buchant0
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1976STATE001582
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: S/S:FVORTIZ
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: N760001-0106
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 2
Legacy Key: link1976/newtext/t19760186/aaaacyia.tel
Line Count: 170
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ORIGIN NODS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: buchant0
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 23 JUN 2004
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <23 JUN 2004 by izenbei0>; APPROVED <04 OCT 2004 by buchant0>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
04 MAY 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: LOCK1
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MEETING WITH PRESIDENT SENGHOR ON ANGOLA
TAGS: PFOR, AO, SG, US, UR, (SENGHOR, LEOPOLD SEDAR)
To: ABIDJAN MULTIPLE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006